Review of Three Kings

Lloyd C. Gardner’s Three Kings; The Rise of An American Empire in the Middle East after World War II is a highly readable account of U.S. policies regarding the Middle East beginning before the end of the war and continuing up to around 1980. It was interesting enough that I ordered his previously published The Long Road to Baghdad; A History of Foreign Policy from the 1970's to the Present. It focuses mainly on two episodes, one dealing with the crisis in Iran in 1951-53, when Mossadegh came to power, the Shah fled, and Iran threatened to nationalize their oil industry. In response, we (through the CIA) organized a coup which led the Shah back into power. The second centers on our dealings with Nasser in Egypt.

The main lesson I take is that the turbulent situation in the Middle East was caused partly by our policies. After the war, the British wanted help controlling the Middle East (they wanted to keep their empire) and the U.S. was only too willing to help, eventually replacing the Brits as the reigning power. After all, the oil that lay under the ground was a source of military power. We promoted stable governments by supporting dictators. Not only the Shah, but we also helped install Saddam in Iraq in 1963 and made it possible for the family of Ibn Saud to rule Saudi Arabia. One of the unintended consequences was that these dictators thereafter were able to blackmail us for money and arms. This was inconsistent with our professed aim, which was to promote self-determination of countries leaving the colonial era and democracy. What we did was to work to thwart Arab nationalism and it led to an arms race. It retarded political change, but when that change came it was virulently anti-U.S., such as during the Iranian revolution in 1979. After that, we tried to use Saddam to prevent the spread of such theological revolution by helping to fund the eight-year war with Iraq. We all live with the consequences today.

The ultimate justification for these actions was the “war against international communism,” even though Russia was not really a threat in this region and there was no universal communist threat as China and Russia were opposing powers. No one doubts the power of Russia in Eastern Europe at the time, but we made our conflicts into an ideological war in order to mobilize public opinion. In promoting these policies, various presidents acquired more power for the executive branch by funding wars without Congressional approval. Whatever you think of the communist threat, the success of these policies in the Middle East was temporary at best.

Irony abounds in this tale. As another example, Truman, in order to win the 1948 election, needed Jewish finance, so he opposed the British, who had the mandate on Palestine and tried to limit Jewish immigration. Ultimately, the Brits tired of this role (they could no longer afford their empire) and abruptly gave up the mandate, after which Israel declared itself a state. And, of course, we ended up being the fund of Israel’s military power, too. Our dealings with Nasser actually drove him to accept Russian assistance in the late 1960's. By keeping Saud in power, we also indirectly empowered the Wahabbis, who Saud had to appease because of the presence of Mecca in his country. Now we also have a dictator in Egypt, are supporting a corrupt government in Afghanistan, and are heavily involved in propping up the governments of Pakistan and Iraq.

These policies involved a uniting of political and economic interests. I imagine that those on the left believe it was the corporate interests that controlled. While this has certainly been the case in the past in some places, such as our invasions of various Latin American countries, I think that here the main force was a misguided effort at keeping the world safe. Of course, the oil companies benefitted, too, at least for awhile. Those on the right would have had us become more directly involved militarily, which ultimately we did in Iraq, partly justifying the action as spreading democracy! Whatever this history teaches us, it at least shows why they don’t trust us. Is it also partly responsible for the rise of violent Islam?

Addendum: This book would be better described as a history of US State Department and executive policy toward the Middle East from 1947-1960, during the Truman and Eisenhower years. Gardner implies that during these years we set the policy that we would follow for years to come.