The Post-American World

Fareed Zakaria’s The Post-American World turned out to be a lively and informed book. Or maybe I just agree with him about a lot of things. He sees America’s hegemonic position as disappearing not because of weakness in America, but because of the rise of other countries out of poverty. The emerging economies of China and India are the clearest examples of challenges to our economic hegemony (not military). I am going to list some points that struck me as insightful or obviously correct.

(1) War and organized violence in the world over the last two decades have declined dramatically, while per capita income has risen dramatically. According to Steven Pinker, we are probably living in the most peaceful time in our species’ existence.

(2) Iraq weakened Al Qaeda because in order to attract Sunni support, it morphed into an anti-Shiite group, thus depriving it of its claim to represent Islam. We ought to be recognizing the distinctness of many of the jihadist groups. The improvised strategy has a crippling weakness; it kills locals, thus alienating ordinary Muslims.

(3) The best counterterrorism policy is resilience; if we are not terrorized, then it doesn’t work.

(4) The financial force that has powered the new era is the free movement of capital around the world. This was largely due to the removal of fixed exchange rates. And the hyperinflation of the 1980's was curtailed due to monetary and fiscal discipline.

(5) The most acute problem of increased wealth in the world is the impact of global growth on natural resources and the environment.

(6) In many countries, there is a pent-up frustration with Western or American narratives. For instance, the standard narrative about World War II is how the U.S. and Britain heroically defeated the Nazis. But the Eastern front involved more land combat than all other theaters of war combined and many more casualties. It was where three-quarters of Germans fought and where they sustained 70% of their casualties. The war is portrayed as a heroic struggle of good over evil, but Britain committed many troops from its empire while denying those people freedom at home. However, the world is currently moving from anger to indifference, from anti-Americanism to post-Americanism. Now that the Cold War has ended, the emerging strong economies can go their own way.

(7) Globalization and outsourcing have actually helped America’s bottom line. Growth (3% vs. 2%) and productivity (2.5% vs. 1.5%) have averaged a full percentage point higher than Germany or Japan. U.S. exports as a percentage of the world have dropped only 1% since 1980 (from 10% to 9%) and the U.S. remains the most competitive economy in the world.

(8) Most Americans (less so for the young) are ignorant of the world beyond their borders and remain convinced that they do not need to learn about others. Thus, they remain convinced that their way must be the best and most advanced. This makes us increasingly suspicious (afraid) of the emerging global era. We are the only country in the world to issue annual report cards of every other country’s behavior. This isn’t just confined to the chest-thumping machismo of the neocons.

(9) The view of multinational companies is far more positive elsewhere. We want the world to accept American companies but when other companies with overseas bases come here, it is a different matter.

Those are from the first two chapters. He goes on to give an account of how the West became supreme which will be quite recognizable to anyone who has read Germs, Guns and Steel. Early in the 20th century, the process of domination culminated with a handful of Western capitals ruling 85% of the world’s land. He then has a couple of very insightful chapters on China and India. They are different in significant ways from the West. Neither Hinduism nor Confucianism believes in universal commandments or the need to spread the faith. And for practical reasons, they are far more interested in economic development to feed the vast number of poor than to engage in traditional western-style military hegemony.

The Chinese-American relationship is one of mutual dependence. China needs the American market to sell its goods; the U.S. needs China to finance its debt. It would be in the interests of each to cooperate. Ironically, while China’s central government allows it to complete grand projects, India’s multi-ethnic democracy makes such projects difficult. Instead, it’s growth comes from a U.S.-style capitalism now that they jettisoned their failed experiment with socialism. Surprisingly, 50% of their GDP is services and their level of personal consumption is second only to the U.S. (67% vs. 70%). Unwittingly, the legacy of Britain’s English language is a great asset in a world economy. The organized minorities are even more powerful in India than here. Only Americans have a more favorable view of the U.S. than Indians (71% vs. 83%).

The last two chapters trace the passing of the world’s hegemonic superpower status from Britain and lay out principles for approaching changing times. We need to learn from Britain’s successes and failures. A number of sensible reforms could be initiated here (e.g. diminished wasteful spending and subsidies, increased savings, achieving significant efficiencies in energy use, etc.), but our political process seems to have lost its ability to create broad coalitions on complex issues. Politics has been “captured by money, special interests, sensationalist media and ideological attack groups.” We have thrived because of our openness to the world–to goods and services, ideas and inventions, people and cultures. Unfortunately, much of our population has been gripped by fear and loathing that fails to recognize what a positive position historically we are in the world today.