Afghan Conundrum

It is time to return to the issue of Afghanistan and our seemingly endless futile quest.  To do what?  The first question we need to consider what are our objectives are in this rugged and lawless place?  "War on terror" is the wrong term to use.  One of the Bush administration's many misleading characterizations of events.  But Obama increased the number of troops there vastly.  What are we trying to do and how to measure success? 

Rory Stewart raises these sorts of questions in his essay The Real Reason We Are in Afghanistan.  I think that he correctly says that Obama increased troops for political reasons. 

The opinion of Frank Rich, the liberal New York Times columnist, is obvious from his essay Kiss This War Goodbye.  I already mentioned the conservative position in the Cato Institute Cato's Letter, which although I have a print copy, does not yet seem available on-line.  But he doesn't think we should be there, either.  Patrick Cockburn, the very liberal pundit, offers suggestions of what to do now in Getting Out of Afghanistan.

Finally, Mohammed Hanit discusses our very troubling relationship with Pakistan in In Pakistan, Echoes of American Betrayal.

So much of what seems right to me any more has to do with "recognizing our limits." I came across a funny quote the other day about the absurdity of training Afghan troops and police to fight. Like many Afghans haven't spent their entire lives in warfare (reminds me of my ancestors in Scotland). This is mostly just another civil war with our "ally" Pakistan supporting terrorists. And a government that stole an election. Time to end the charade.  But do we just want to pull all the troops out?  I am undecided on this question, but I think we should leave a small long-term presence there.  After all, the main goal was to prevent the Taliban from taking control so that terrorists could not use Afghanistan as a training ground.  That was easily accomplished. 

Now, somehow, we need to find a way to try to get Pakistan to help create a more peaceful place across its border (the Army cannot control its side of the border, either).  As Hanif notes, while the ISI (Pakistani secret police) and the Army have often been on the side of the Taliban, the Pakistani populace wants an end to war.  I am going to reread these pieces and suggest something more specific, but Cockburn may be on the right track.  More later on this issue.

Consider this counterfactual.  What if we and the Saudis had never aided the mujahdeen in defeating the Soviets?  They would not have all the sophisticated weapons they have now and the problems would still be Russia's to solve.  Can we learn something from this possible world?  Steve Coll's Ghost Wars is an excellent historical account of this time period, especially from the 1980's to 9/11.